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MATTHEW D. STROUD
INFALLIBLE TEXTS AND RIGHTEOUS INI'ERPRETATIONS:

DON QUI]OTE AND RELIGIOUS FUl\TDAMENTALISM

Religion in Don Quijote has been a frequent subject of inquiry
over the past century. As a "vehicle for religious expression," to use
Ziolkowski's terminology (1), Cervantes's masterpiece has been
studied as an analogy of the relationship between religious faith and
the world around it (Ziolkowski 8), as a manifestation of the historic
clash between the secularization of the modern era and the waning
medieval domination by "religious institutions and symbols"
(Ziolkowski 9, citing Berger 107), as a vessel of both the spirit and
the letter of selected pronouncements of the Council of Trent
(Descouzis 479), as a text that fell under the scrutiny of the Inquisi
tion (Castro, "Cervantes" 427; Boruchoff 40-49), proof of Cer
vantes's own religious orthodoxy or lack thereof (Spitzer 6r; Castro,
El pensamiento 240-320), and· a study of the nature of belief and its
relationship to truth: "truth is always a function of belief" (Forcione
109). Special attention, of course, has been paid to the scrutiny of
Don Quijote's library by the priest, Pero Perez, in Part r, Chapter 5
(Eisenberg, Ziolkowski 2 8), Quijote's encounter with Ricote
(Ramirez-Araujo, Boruchoff 53), and the more than 160 quotations
from and allusions to passages from the Bible (Monroy 79-173), as
well as "minor irreverences" and "occasional jibes" seen throughout
(Ziolkowski 27-28). This brief overview is, of course, only a taste of
the scholarship available on the subject, but it will suffice here to
establish the scope and breadth of previous discussion of religion in
the Quijote.
This present study will attempt to view the actions and beliefs of
the character of Don Quijote in light of a facet of religious expres
sion that has become increasingly visible and culturally important on
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a global scale in the past few decades, religious fundamentalism.
More to the point, what is proposed here is an exploration of the
way in which Don Quijote's treatment of the chivalresquc texts that
inform his fantasies, as well as his actions as a knight-errant, mirror
the manner in which religious fundamentalists treat their sacred texts
and the ways in which they carry their beliefs into their daily lives.
The point here is not to claim that Cervantes himself took a position
one way or the other on fundamentalism, that he intended Don Qui
jote to be a means to provide commentary on the phenomenon, or
that he had any conception of fundamentalism as we know it.
Rather, the guiding spirit here is that afforded to all succeeding gen
erations: the opportunity and the obligation to review received texts
in the light of the shifting priorities of the contexts in which one
reads them, in this case religious fundamentalism as it exists at the
beginning of the twenty-first century.
The term, "fundamentalism," dates from 1920 and is credited to
Curtis Lee Laws, editor of a conservative religious publication,
Watchman-Examiner. It was based on a series of pamphlets entitled
"The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth," published between
1910 and 1915 (Power 43). As a religious, political, and social phe
nomenon, fundamentalism has been quite rigorously studied by
such preeminent scholars as Martin Marty, R. Scott Appleby, and J.
K. Hadden. Some of the enumerated characteristics of religious fun
damentalism - such as the fundamentalist defense of traditional
Christian values against modern ways of thinking (Hadden 1637)
overlap with more general studies of religion in the novel. Funda
mentalists are deeply concerned with the erosion of religion and its
-

proper role in society (Almond, Sivan, and Appleby 405). They see
their primary mission as standing in opposition to modernism
(Lawrence 6) and in favor of a "divine restoration" (Lawrence 1).
They see themselves as part of an immense cosmic struggle through
the filter of which they seize on and reinterpret historical moments
(Marty and Appleby 819). The fundamentalist enterprise is nothing
less than "a proclamation of reclaimed authority over a sacred tradi

tion which is to be reinstated as an antidote for a society that has
strayed from its cultural mooring" {Hadden 1641).
Don Quijote likewise frequently laments the erosion of tradition
and condemns modern customs; the most famous and most succinct
of his pronouncements regarding the degeneration of the world
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occurs in his speech on the edad dorada in 1.11. Here the way things
used to be, at least in his view of the world, is described in terms that
border on the prelapsarian and paradisiacal: "Dichosa edad y siglos
dichosos a quicn los antiguos pusieron nombre de dorados," "santa
edad," "magnifica abundancia," and the like (104-5). This ideal
vision of the past is contrasted with the debased and unhappy pre
sent: "nuestros detestables siglos," "pestilencia," "malicia," and so
on (106). In much the same way that Justice Antonin Scalia of the
Supreme Court of the United States views progressive efforts to
bring freedom and equality to everyone as a Kulturkampf pitting
debased modern values against impeccable traditional ones, 1 Quijote
clearly views this "cultural war" as a cosmic struggle. Not only can the
rerurn of tradition serve as a necessary curative to the dissipation he
secs all around him, but he himself has taken on the task of righting the
wrongs he sees. Like fundamentalists everywhere, Quijote believes that
it is not enough merely to lament the erosion of ·traditional values; he
must declare his own sacred authority and personally commit to their
reinstitution: "Desta orden soy yo ... " (106).
From a fundamentalist perspective, the use of the term "war" is
not merely metaphorical. The world is divided into "us" and
"them," good and evil. The fundamentalist project is not just a philo
sophical or religious debate; it is an active confrontation with those
considered to be enemies (Lawrence 100), whom they prefer to
demonize and mythologize rather than engage in dialogue (Marty
and Appleby 820). When others refuse to accept his version of real
ity, Quijote quickly and menacingly categorizes them as enemies and
threatens them with violence as in the case of the merchants from
Toledo in 1 + Although they are willing to go along with the asser
tion of Dulcinea's just to placate the irate knight, that is not good
enough; they must truly believe blindly as he does: ";vosotros
pagareis la grande blasfcmia que habeis dicho contra tamaii.a beldad
como es la de mi senora!" (60). Rationalism, relativism, pluralism,
and secularism are all equated with infidelity (Lawrence ix) or with
an insufficient knowledge of or dedication to the sacred principles.
Sancho's realism is frequently dismissed as lack of sufficient knowl
edge or dedication to the cause. When Sancho states unequivocally
that the windmills are just that and not giants, Quijote's response is
to denigrate Sancho's faith in the libros de caballeria: "no estas cur
sado en esto de las aventuras" (I, 8: 82; cf. I, 18: 160: "jQuc poco
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sabes, Sancho, ... de achaque de caballeria!"). The more extreme
response to a queStioning of inerrant truth is the charge of blasphe
my, which Quijote hurls at his niece (579;2.6).
Grounded in militarism, as Marty and Appleby point out {ix).
fundamentalists fight back against a society they consider to be
degenerate, fight for their beliefs, fight with the resources at their
disposal, fight against those who disagree with them, and fight under
God "or under the signs of some transcendent reference," which, in
the analogy to Don Quijotc, would be chivalresque ideals.2 Because
of the stark contrast in which they view "us" versus "them," there is
a strong tendency towards Manichacism (Almond, Sivan, and
Appleby 406"7); the current President of the United States has stat
ed, "If you are not with us, you are against us," thus revealing his
own Manichaeism as he, according to his own definitions, separates
people into categories of good and evil. This black and white view of
the world additionally leads one to an extreme rigidity of interpreta
tion (Quijote's actions are so reactionary that even Spanish society
under the Inquisition seems too permissive) as well as to grand asser
tions of the individual's ability to change the course of the world.
Given the belief that they have been called or chosen to rid the world
of evil, the fundamentalist called to action displays a similar tenden
cy towards Messianism.3 Of course, Don Quijote is not shy about
characterizing his mission as divine. When he comes across the
group of men taking images of saints to a nearby village for an altar
piece in 2.58, Quijote puts himself quite boldly on the same footing
as Saints George, Martin, James, and Paul: "cstos santos y caballeros
profesaron lo que yo profeso, que es el ejercicio de las armas" (954).
The division of peoples and nations into "us" and "them,"
"good" and "evil" (Lawrence 108, u6) is a function of belief, or,
more exactly, the belief in the authority of a certain text or texts. Not
only does the approach one takes to a particular sacred text help to
draw boundaries between believers and non-believers; it also
bespeaks one's relationship with reality and truth. As Ron Suskind
has pointed out with regard to the world view of President George
W. Bush and his dependence upon instincts and beliefs to the exclu
sion of "reality-based" facts and interpretations (46, 51), fundamen
talists defend belief-based reinterpretations of historical moments
even in the presence of evidence to the contrary. Belief in beings and
occurrences such as miracles, angels, demons, and the like are not at
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all dependent upon the ability to verify them in reality. Quijote
believes that it is possible for wizards to cast spells, that there are
encantadores and devils, even when Sancho is right there to tell him
that what he sees is something else. However, Quijote is not merely
deluded when he sees castles instead of inns (43;1.2) or giants instead
of windmills (81;1.8); he must interpret what he sees according to
what he has read in his "sacred" texts. His interpretation is based on
his faith (in his chivalric ideals), not in facts grounded in reality.4 Of
course, Quijote's clearest statement that belief is ultimately not a
function of evidence occurs in his discussion of the Cueva de Mon
tesinos: "hay algunos que se cansan en saber y averiguar cosas que
despues de sabidas y averiguadas no importan un ardite al
entendimiento ni a la memoria" (698;2.22).
Central to the beliefs of both fundamentalists and Don Quijote
arc the texts themselves that are considered to be literally inerrant
and absolute descriptions of a revealed, unified truth (Lawrence 6,
109; Almond, Sivan and Appleby 407; Hadden 1637) upon which is
based the law that must be followed in order to act in a righteous
manner. Similar to the importance of confrontation mentioned
above, it is not enough that believers accept these tenets on faith,
they demand that "dictates from scripture be publicly recognized
and legally enforced" (Lawrence 27; cf. 232). The same is true of
one's particular beliefs drawn from textual interpretations. Dulcinea
may not have appeared in Quijote's "sacred texts," but because of his
readings of them, he not only believes that Aldonza Lorenzo is Dul
cinea de! Toboso, everyone else must accept his faith-based vision as
well: '"Todo el mundo sc tcnga, si todo el mundo no confiesa que no
hay en el mundo todo doncella mas hcrmosa que la emperatriz de la
Mancha, la sin par Dulcinea del Toboso"' (59;q). When political
power becomes bound up with faith, the result is an application of
belief by force, even when those imposing the belief may not believe
it themselves. Regarding the existence of Dulcinea, for example, the
Duke and Duchess assure Quijote that they will order all those in
their household to believe that she exists, that she is high-born and
beautiful, and that she is worthy of such a knight as Don Quijote

(777;2.32).

T hose of us who toil in the groves of literature are quite familiar with
problems that arise with privileged interpretations: selectivity, logical
fallacies, errors in transmission, inner contradictions, and the like.
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Sacred tcxtS, like all others, are just as susceptible to these problems,
but fundamentalists, even when they acknowledge their existence,
are able to explain away their importance if they pose a challenge to

(Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, and Latin), it is astonishing that anyone
believes that any translation into a modern language can be consid
ered to be inerrant unless one also believes that God inspired the

their beliefs. When one pursues the notion of textual truth even fur
ther, one comes upon a basic conflict in the fundamentalist reading
of a text. As with the case of all readers reading all texts, fundamen
talists at some point have to acknowledge a gap between the words
and their meaning. While the very words themselves are considered
to be literally true, they also bespeak a truth beyond the words
themselves that may or may not contradict one or another interpre
tation. "Scripture may be the highest explicit authority, but it is
always cited to advance a principle that supersedes, even while
acknowledging, scriptural authority" (Lawrence 116).
Consider just two problems with the notion of inerrancy: textu
al corruption and translation. Biblical scholars are well aware of the
fact that there are no original manuscriptS of the Bible, that even the
oldest of the copies we know of were written decades, if not centuries,
after the fact, and that they disagree among themselves regarding both
what they say and how they say it. Nevertheless, the fact that scripture
may be derived from corrupt or ambiguous sources does not deter fun
damentalists from revering the texts as "canonically fixed, safeguarded,
transmitted, and obeyed" (Lawrence 108) or from asserting that their
interpretations of those textS, and theirs alone, are the only ones that
reflect the truth. Sometimes the argumentS border on the absurd; in my
own family I have heard intense discussions about the theological
implications of the singular verb in the phrase, "the wages of sin is
death" (Romans 6: 2 3) when in fact it merely derives from the use of

work of the translators. (Not dealt with openly are the differences
among translations. Did God inspire all of them equally? If so, how

a singular verb with a neuter plural in Greek. The defense of one's
interpretation can be violent and full of rage. Not dissimilar is Qui
jote's reaction to Maese Pedro's retablo, which, when it does not
conform to his recollection of his reading of the source text, as well
as his larger understanding of the world ("entre morns no se usan
campanas," 733;2.26), promptS him to violence and destruction.
And, of course, what is one to make of the disjunction between the
inerrancy of the chivalric novels and the errors that Sancho and Qui
jote discover in the first part of their own saga (565-66;2.4)? 5
In addition to the lack of a single, verifiable source text, transla
tion is a thorny problem for Biblical literalists. Considering the vari
ety of languages of importance to Biblical scholarship and tradition

could there be variations?) Translation, of course, is also at the heart
of Don Quijote, the novel. While the chivalric texts upon which
Quijote bases his adventures are for the most part written in Span
ish, Quijote is also concerned about the accuracy of the book writ
ten about him. Considering his worries that Cide Hamete's text
might be full of errors since it was written by a Moor (558;2.3), and
considering that in 2.62, he utters his famous assertions that reading
a translation is like looking at a tapestry from the back with all the
knots and loose strings visible (998), it is surprising that he is willing
either to give translators credit for accurately representing a text in
another language or that he is willing to elide the problems that
translations present. It is surprising, that is, unless there is an element
of faith in his mission and commitment to the texts themselves that
runs counter to logical argument.
Related to the idea of the text that "reveals" a truth is the effort that
is required to read and re-read a text in order to discover that truth. Just
as religious scholars over the centuries have pored over passages, even
single words, of sacred text, Quijote spent nights on end trying to deci
pher the meanings of the abstruse chivalric locutions. Of course, just as
some Biblical passages are simply inscrutable because of the archaic lan
guage in which they are written, or because of errors introduced in the
transmission of the text, Cervantes interjeccs a wry criticism when he
notes that Quijote could not possibly have understood the passages, "ni
las entendicra el mesmo Arist6teles, si resucitara para solo ello" (I, 1: 37).
The issue of interpretation is also related to the notion of exegesis by
learned readers of the text who, within the terms of the novel, are more
or less equivalent to the various "autores" who dispute minor points
such as whether the adventure of Puerto Lap ice came before or after that
of the windmills (I, 2: 43).6 Quijote, of course, does not disparage either
the Bible or Spanish history. Indeed, in explaining to Sancho the mean
ing of "Santiago, y cierra Espana" in 2.58, he uses the same language to
speak of the works of Saint James during the Reconquest as he does in
his citations of chivalric novels: "muchas veces le han visto visiblemente
en ellas [las batallas], derribando, atropellando, destruyendo y matando
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los agarenos escuadroncs, y desta verdad te pudiera traer muchos ejem
plos que en las verdaderas historias espaiiolas se cuentan" (956).
One important way that fundamentalists avoid problems based
on textual inconsistencies and contradictions is through their selec
tive reverence for different passages of their received texts. Despite
the general disdain for modernity, this picking and choosing of scrip
tures to fight for and scriptures to gloss over reveals how much of
modernity they are willing to accept and how much they are ready
to fight against (Many and Appleby 825-26; Almond, Sivan, and
Appleby 4o6; Lawrence 15).Those of us currently living in the United
States are more than familiar with the disconnection between the insis
tence of the religious right on the enforcement of prohibitions against
homosexuality while turning a blind eye to matters of divorce, dietary
restrictions, and the whole host of "abominations" listed in the Holi
ness Code in Leviticus. Likewise, Quijote, who reacted violently to
points with which he disagreed in Maese Pedro's puppet show, seems
to have absolute faith in what the fortune-telling monkey told him
(that part of what he alleges to have seen in the Cueva de Montesinos
was true and part was false), while, at the same time,"el se atenfa mas a
las verdaderas que a las mentirosas" (750;1.29). Also related co selectiv
ity is the tendency of modern American Christian fundamentalism to
alter its interpretation of scripture that is elsewhere proclaimed as
inerrant to suit its own personal ends. The theology of wealth, for
example, which states that if God loves you He will make you wealthy
flies directly into the face of Christ's admonitions to give away all
earthly possessions. Quijote seems to have a similar ability to distort
textual truth into a defense of his own behavior, as he does when he
takes the good news of the birth of Jesus, which is clearly focused on
peace, and uses it to support his bellicose adventures: "Esta paz es el
verdadero fin de la guerra" (389;1.37).
Jus� as religious fundamentalism believes in the notion of divine
intervention in one's daily life, and therefore in the power of peti
tionary prayer, Quijote calls upon his own deified Dulcinea to come to
his aid in his battle against the evil giants (82; 1.8), which those who
have a reality-based view of the world see as windmills. The other side
of the same coin is the notion that one is punished in this life if one
strays from scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law. Similar to the
comments of Anita Bryant to the effect that San Francisco suffers
earthquakes because so many homosexuals live there, Sancho, who is
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able to turn Quijote's arguments against him when it suits his pur
pose, ascribes their misfortunes to his master's failure to fulfill his
vow in accordance with the laws of chivalry: "han sido pena del
pecado cometido por vuestra mcrced contra la orden de su caballerfa,
no habiendo cumplido el juramento que hizo de no comer pan a
manteles . . ." (17o;u9). This linking of text to belief to law to behav
ior is an important aspect of the projection of fundamentalism into
society at large, and is a function of the fundamentalist conception of
the relationship between self and others.
One's fundamentalist beliefs are more than just a matter of one's
faith; they are a function of one's identity. One does not just believe
one or another tenet, one is a born-again Christian (and, of course,
the whole notion of what "born-again" entails is fodder for yet fur
ther heated disagreement). This element of identity is seen in the
broad cultural, social, and individual traits ascribed to Muslims and
Christians in Don Quijote. Ricote's statement, "la Ricota mi hija y
Francisca Ricota mi mujer con cat6licas cristianas, y aunque yo no lo
soy tanto, todavfa tengo mas de Cristiano que de moro ..." (933;2.54)
is couched more in terms of who Ricote and his family are rather
than in what religious beliefs they hold. The question of identity is
raised again in 2.63, when Ana Felix declares that she is a true Chris
tian "y no de las fingidas ni aparentes" ( 1005). The notion that one
can fake one's identity in matters of religion lies at the heart of both
a certain insecurity regarding its nature as well as an opening for the
possibility of hypocrisy. If one can pass as a fundamentalist Christ
ian when one is not, then how is one to know who one is? Moreover,
who gets to decide who meets all the requirements of fundamental
ism and who falls short? The answer is that in addition to its strict
behavioral requirements, there is also a strong egoistic tendency in
fundamentalism to consider only those who meet one's own criteria
to be "real" Christians, despite the fact that two fundamentalists
may disagree in substantial ways about what it is that constitutes
one's Christian identity. This dispute over who is really who one
says he is and who is not is underscored in Sancho's discussion in
i..72, of the Avellaneda Quijote with Alvaro Tarfe, who claims to be
a great friend of "Don Quijote" (1053). Sancho's assertion, "Todo
cualquier otro don Quijote y cualquier otro Sancho Panza es
burlerfa y cosa de sueiio" (1054) not only reflects the notion that
one's identity can be called into question by someone else, it also
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challenges the validity of such assertions of identity altogether since
there is no "real" Don Quijote at all. Even within the terms of Cer
vantes's literary fiction, "Don Quijote" was the creation of "Alonso
Quijano" and was thus just as much a fabrication as Tarfe's friend cre
ated by "Avellaneda" (whoever that is; this is yet another problematic
identity). At the end of the day, if one can renounce one's identity and
one's faith as easily as Don Quijote does(" ...yo no soy don Quijote de
la Mancha, sino Alonso Quijano, a quien mis costumbres me dieron
renombre de Bueno. Ya soy enemigo de Amadfs de Gaula y de toda la
infinita caterva de su linaje, ya me son odiosas todas las historias pro
fanas del andante caballerfa," 1063-64), how firm is any assertion of
one's identity? Perhaps the constructed nature of such an identity,
along with its fluidity and changeability, are the motivation behind the
vehemence with which all fundamentalists practice their faith and pro
claim their beliefs. Sometimes people really do protest too much.
Religious idealism serves as the basis of both personal and commu

nal identities (Marty and Appleby 817); fundamentalists consider
themselves to be part of a reactionary minority movement They make
little or no effort to blend into the larger society and are, indeed, inten
tionally scandalous to make the point that outsiders cannot understand
them (Marty and Appleby 818). To that end, they generate their own
technical vocabulary (Lawrence roo) and adhere to strict behavioral
requirements (Almond, Sivan, and Appleby 408). Indeed, fundamen
talism also derives from the holiness movement "which was just as con
cerned with correct behavior as with correct belief" (Hadden 1637).
Don Quijote demonstrates all of these qualities.
Quijote relishes his minority status. He carries his unique burden as
defender of the old values as a marker of his special mission as a knight
errant. He views himself as above, or at least apart from, the law:"(Y
d6nde has visto tU, o leido jamas, que caballero andante haya sido
puesto ante la justicia por mas homicidios que hubiese cometido?"
(98;1.10). Later, at the inn, Quijote protests that he does not have to pay
taxes like other people:"(Que caballero andante pag6 pecho, alcabala,
chapfn de la reina, moneda forera, portazgo ni barca" (465;q5). Over
and over again, Quijote goes out of his way to assen his vision of the
world. While "intentionally scandalous" may be too strong a term,
there is no doubt that Quijote seeks out occasions to be provocative,
whether it is in his attempt to free the galley-slaves (he could just as eas
ily have accepted the explanation of the guards, r .22) or in his desire
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to prove his madness in the Sierra Morena ("Loco soy, loco he de
ser," 238;r.25). Moreover, that others cannot understand Quijote is
proved on two different levels. On the first, which also embodies the
use of language that is difficult or impossible to understand, Quijote
frequently uses an archaic form of speech and references that his lis
teners are not likely to grasp. Quijote's reverence for old texts leads
him, especially when he is in activist mode, to speak in archaic lan
guage, as when he addresses the "mozas dcl panido" at the inn
(43;1.2) and lectures Maritornes and the inn-keeper's wife, both of
whom are left as confused "como si hablara en griego" (145;r.16).
Even when he is not using archaic language, his concepts leave oth
ers bewildered, as is the case with the goatherds who listen to his
"Golden Age" speech "embobados y suspensos" (ro6;u 1). On the
second level, even those closest to Don Quijote have a hard time
understanding his actions. The barber, the priest, his niece, and even
Sancho Panza ponder his behavior and wonder at its bizarre and
incomprehensible nature (r.6-8). His actions, of course, merely
reflect Quijote's attempt to adhere, to the best of his ability, to the
strict behavioral requirements expected of him.
Ultimately, fundamentalism is more than just an approach to reli
gious belief, it is the basis for a code of conduct. Part of the anti
modernism of a fundamentalist approach to life is the insistence that
one's actions must always be in accordance with the models of
behavior found in the Bible. The Christian fundamentalist believes
that one must live one's life in imitation of Jesus Christ, thus giving
rise to the familiar phrase, "What would Jesus do?" Apparently, this
open-ended question is an invitation for vast speculation in instances
in which one has no idea what Christ would have done because He
was never confronted with such situations. Nevertheless, this right
eous imitation, based at least as much on one's interpretation as on
the text imitated, is echoed in Quijote's insistence upon imitating his
chivalric models. When Sancho asks for his back pay, Quijote's irate
response is to note that there is no textual evidence for any squire
asking for such thing (748;2.28).7 This adherence to behavior based
on imitation of the actions depicted in sacred texts extends even t o
those cases in which Quijote has not suffered a s the knights-errant
did nor has he been provoked as they were.8 Quijote's response
implies that his approach to living as a fundamentalist knight-errant
is somehow purer even than that of the knights in the book precise-
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ly because he has no real reason to live as he does: "esa es la fineza
de mi negocio; que volverse loco un caballero andante con causa, ni
grado ni gracias: el toque esta desatinar sin ocasi6n... " (23 8;x.2 5). His
efforts to decide whom to imitate in the Sierra Morena (u6) clearly
show that it does not really matter to him what he does, only that h e
can ultimately point t o some textual model rather than logic, reason,
or common sense, as the basis of his actions.
As all readers of Don Quijote come to realize, a great part of the
joy of reading the book lies in the fact that we, too, are caught up in
questions of truth and fiction just as the character Quijote was.
When the priest pronounces him "truthfully" dead ("verdadera
mente se muere," 1064), the notions of truth, our faith in the written
text, and even the nature of belief itself have been so tested, not to
say manipulated, that we find ourselves believing that Quijote really
is dead and that there will be no further episodes. That Cervantes
assumed that future authors would take his word that Quijote was
dead and, even more astonishingly considering its success, the fact
that other authors took him at his word, is a testament to the power
of belief in a text, even when one knows there are problems with it,
even when one knows that it is pure fiction. Don Quijote is a fun
damentalist believer in inerrant texts, and his story invites us into his
world of certainty and faith, not so much in the adventures of
knights errant, but in the power of fiction and interpretation over all
evidence to the contrary. Like the fundamentalist's "faith-based
world," the readers of Don Quijote are quite familiar with the way
in which one's beliefs and one's hopes can trump one's logic and
one's understanding of the "reality-based world." This relationship,
which lies at the heart of the Baroque preoccupation with reality and
appearance, may have been disdained and marginalized by the
Enlightenment, but, as modern religious fundamentalism shows us,
it has hardly ceased to exist.
At the same time that this reading of the Quijote tells us some
thing about a religious fundamentalist view of the world, it also
reveals something about the nature of literature and the way one
reads a text. Quijote's principal failing is that he fails to read his
source texts as stories, as literature, as fiction. By insisting that they
are history, he denies them any validity as works of art. His criti
cisms of both the Avellaneda text and his own Part I are based more
on the accuracy of the events described than on the literary values
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that they present. The dichotomy between history and fiction in the
Quijote has been well studied, but when one couches this conflict in
terms of religious belief, it takes on a new and strikingly more rele
vant meaning. Reading Cervantes's masterpiece forces the reader to
confront the possibility that "history" may be far from factual and
that "fiction" may present greater truths even if they are in abstract
ed form. Ultimately, all readings (whether literalist, interpretive, or
casual) view some aspects of the texts as important, to the exclusion
of others. Moreover, a righteous literalist interpretation of a sacred
inviolate text always eventually confronts different viewpoints
expressed by other readers who are equally as firm in their beliefs of
their correctness. Unfortunately, as Quijote's misadventures, seven
teenth-century intolerance, and twenty-first century terrorism show
us, readers may still be seduced by the notion of an infallible text.
The dangers of such interpretations are real, and that is one of the
great truths of Don Quijote, expressed in a web of fiction, history,
belief, and religion.

Notes
I.

Scalia's use of the German term, in his dissent in Romer v. Evans

(517 U.S. at 636), was the first instance of its use in Supreme Court deci
sions. For more on the legal contexts of

"Kulturkampf," as well

full legal citation of Scalia's dissenting opinion, see Michaelson.

as the

2. It would not be accurate to assert that there is no linkage between
Quijote's fundamentalist devotion to chivalresque notions and his
Christian beliefs. There are numerous times in which Quijote conflates
his belief in the chivalric novels with his belief in Christianity (which
does not depart from the warlike approach to Christianity of the novels
themselves), as when he notes that one of his missions is to extirpate the
seven deadly sins from the "gigantcs" they meet (594;2.8). Nevertheless,
the texts upon which he relics are almost exclusively chivalric rather
than religious, which at least indirectly creates a division between the
two kinds of texts from which he derives his motivation.

3. Almond, Sivan, and Appleby

407-8. Perhaps because of the male-
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dominated nature of traditional societies, and despite the presence of many
women in fundamentalist movements, an additional characteristic is the
fact that such movements are inevitably led by males (Marty and Appleby
826) or, more specifically, populated by "secondary-level male elites led by
a charismatic leader" who, of course, is also male (Lawrence 100; cf. 141).

4. As has been well documented, Quijote's willingness to believe in
a truth that goes contrary to what his eyes and good judgment tells him
is for the most part turned on its head in Part 2. Consider the appear
ance of the "devil" who comes to announce the arrival of Montesinos i n
2.34. Here Quijote is quite skeptical: "'Si vos fuerades Diablo ... , ya
hubierades conocido al ta! caballero don Quijote de la Mancha, pues le
teneis delante'" (794).
5. While Quijote adopts an attitude of textual infallibility, the novel
as a whole clearly docs not. Quite ironically, the myriad layers of textu
al uncertainty reflect to a remarkable degree the problems facing those
who view Biblical scripture as a fixed text that cannot be challenged. In
both cases, the narrative thread is complicated by a profusion of voic
es: multiple authors who are either completely unknown except through
the very texts themselves, tl'2nslators, lost manuscripts, and editorial
judgments that one or another part of a text is apocryphal, the same
term applied to those books of the Bible that are to be revered but not
necessarily believed as undisputed truth (the narrator even uses the term
"ap6crifo;" sec 570, 573;2.5). Those who have studied Don Quijote as a
criticism of religious dogma have not frequently addressed the notion of
t�ual infallibility head on, but the evidence is there, and it is the same
kind of overwhelming evidence that confronts modern fundamentalists,
who have actually been known to state that Jesus Christ himself spoke
in King James English.

6. The proliferation of authors and narrative voices in the text is also
an echo of the various Biblical authors to whom different parts and ver
!>ions of both the Old and New Testaments are ascribed.
7. It is of some interest that Sancho himself imitates Biblical models,
as with his decisions showing the wisdom and mercy of Solomon in his
dispensation of the cases brought before him as governor of Barataria
(2.45, 47, 49, p). The greatest difference is that Sancho does not make
much of a fuss about the fact that he too is striving to imitate what he
has learned from sacred texts.
8. Ironically, the canon, in his attempt to dissuade Quijote from pur-
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suing his adventures in knight-errantry and bring him back in line with
Church doctrine, also equates Biblical scripture and chivalric novels in
his suggestion that, if Quijote insists on imitating textual models, be
should look to the Bible, in particulu the Book of Judges, for inspira
tion (494;1-49). In typical Cervantinc fashion, Quijote sums up the
canon's argument with an apt criticism of his own behavior("que yo he
hecho mal en leerlos [los libros de caballeria], y peor en creerlos, y mas
ma! en irnitarlos," 495;1.49) before he pronounces his statement of belief
that Amadis and the other knights existed as sure as the sun shines and
ice is cold. There seems to be linle room for a modern-day interpreta
tion other than that belief in the inerrant truth of chivalric novels is no
different from a belief in the inerrant truth of stories from the Bible.
Even the canon equates the two: "era como una religion de las que aho
ra se usan de Santiago o d e Calatrava" (498;1.49). In Part II, his niece
says that Quijote would have made a good priest (579;2.6); Quijote him
self is more direct: "religion es la caballerfa; caballeros santos hay en la
gloria" (596;1.8).
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